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Abstract
We present an implementation of a method for finding
counterexamples to universally quantified conjectures in
first-order logic. Our method uses the proof by consis-
tency strategy to guide a search for a counterexample and
a standard first-order theorem prover to perform a concur-
rent check for inconsistency. We explain briefly the theory
behind the method, describe our implementation, and eval-
uate results achieved on a variety of incorrect conjectures
from various sources.
Some work in progress is also presented: we are apply-
ing the method to the verification of cryptographic security
protocols. In this context, a counterexample to a security
property can indicate an attack on the protocol, and our
method extracts the trace of messages exchanged in order
to effect this attack. This application demonstrates the ad-
vantages of the method, in that quite complex side condi-
tions decide whether a particular sequence of messages is
possible. Using a theorem prover provides a natural way
of dealing with this. Some early results are presented and
we discuss future work.
1 Introduction
Inductive theorem provers are frequently employed in the
verification of programs, algorithms and protocols. How-
ever, programs and algorithms often contain bugs, and pro-
tocols may be flawed, causing the proof attempt to fail. It
can be hard to interpret a failed proof attempt: it may be
that some additional lemmas need to be proved or a gener-
alisation made. In this situation, a tool which can not only
detect an incorrect conjecture, but also supply a counterex-
ample in order to allow the user to identify the bug or flaw,
is potentially very valuable. The problem of cryptographic
security protocol verification is a specific area in which in-
correct conjectures are of great consequence. If a security
conjecture turns out to be false, this can indicate an attack
on the protocol. A counterexample can help the user to see
how the protocol can be attacked. Incorrect conjectures
also arise in automatic inductive theorem provers where
generalisations are speculated by the system. Often we en-
counter the problem of over-generalisation: the speculated
formula is not a theorem. A method for detecting these
over-generalisations is required.
Proof by consistency is a technique for automating in-
ductive proofs in first-order logic. Originally developed
to prove correct theorems, this technique has the prop-
erty of being refutation complete, i.e. it is able to refute
in finite time conjectures which are inconsistent with the
set of hypotheses. When originally proposed, this tech-
nique was of limited applicability. Recently, Comon and
Nieuwenhuis have drawn together and extended previous
research to show how it may be more generally applied,
[10]. They describe an experimental implementation of
the inductive completion part of the system. However, the
check for refutation or consistency was not implemented.
This check is necessary in order to ensure a theorem is
correct, and to automatically refute an incorrect conjec-
ture. We have implemented a novel system integrating
Comon and Nieuwenhuis’ experimental prover with a con-
current check for inconsistency. By carrying out the check
in parallel, we are able to refute incorrect conjectures in
cases where the inductive completion process fails to ter-
minate. The parallel processes communicate via sockets
using Linda, [8].
The ability of the technique to prove complex induc-
tive theorems is as yet unproven. That does not concern
us here – we are concerned to show that it provides an
efficient and effective method for refuting incorrect con-
jectures. However, the ability to prove at least many small
theorems helps alleviate a problem reported in Protzen’s
work on disproving conjectures, [22] – that the system ter-
minates only at its depth limit in the case of a small unsat-
isfiable formula, leaving the user or proving system none
the wiser.
We have some early results from our work in progress,
which is to apply the technique to the aforementioned
problem of cryptographic security protocol verification.
These protocols often have subtle flaws in them that are
not detected for years after they have been proposed. By
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devising a first-order version of Paulson’s inductive for-
malism for the protocol verification problem, [21], and ap-
plying our refutation system, we can not only detect flaws
but also automatically generate the sequence of messages
needed to expose these flaws. By using an inductive model
with arbitrary numbers of agents and runs rather than the
finite models used in most model-checking methods, we
have the potential to synthesise parallel session and replay
attacks where a single principal may be required to play
multiple roles in the exchange.
In the rest of the paper, we first review the litera-
ture related to the refutation of incorrect conjectures and
proof by consistency, then we briefly examine the Comon-
Nieuwenhuis method. We describe the operation of the
system, relating it to the theory, and present and evaluate
the results obtained so far. The system has been tested
on a number of examples from various sources including
Protzen’s work [22], Reif et al.’s, [24], and some of our
own. Our work in progress on the application of the system
to the cryptographic protocol problem is then presented.
Finally, we describe some possible further work and draw
some conclusions.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Refuting Incorrect Conjectures
At the CADE-15 workshop on proof by mathematical in-
duction, it was agreed that the community should address
the issue of dealing with non-theorems as well as theo-
rems1. However, relatively little work on the problem has
since appeared. In the early nineties Protzen presented a
sound and complete calculus for the refutation of faulty
conjectures in theories with free constructors and complete
recursive definitions, [22]. The search for the counterex-
ample is guided by the recursive definitions of the function
symbols in the conjecture. A depth limit ensures termina-
tion when no counterexample can be found.
More recently, Reif et al., [25], have implemented a
method for counterexample construction that is integrated
with the interactive theorem prover KIV, [23]. Their
method incrementally instantiates a formula with construc-
tor terms and evaluates the formulae produced using the
simplifier rules made available to the system during proof
attempts. A heuristic strategy guides the search through
the resulting subgoals for one that can be reduced to false.
If such a subgoal is not found, the search terminates when
all variables of generated sorts have been instantiated to
constructor terms. In this case the user is left with a model
condition, which must be used to decide whether the in-
stantiation found is a valid counterexample.
1The minutes of the discussion are available from
http://www.cee.hw.ac.uk/˜air/cade15/
cade-15-mind-ws-session-3.html.
Ahrendt has proposed a refutation method using model
construction techniques, [1]. This is restricted to free
datatypes, and involves the construction of a set of suit-
able clauses to send to a model generation prover. As first
reported, the approach was not able in general to find a
refutation in finite time, but new work aims to address this
problem, [2].
2.2 Proof by Consistency
Proof by consistency is a technique for automating induc-
tive proof. It has also been called inductionless induction,
and implicit induction, as the actual induction rule used
is described implicitly inside a proof of the conjecture’s
consistency with the set of hypotheses. Recent versions
of the technique have been shown to be refutation com-
plete, i.e. are guaranteed to detect non-theorems in finite
time.2 The proof by consistency technique was developed
to solve problems in equational theories, involving a set of
equations defining the initial model3, E. The first version
of the technique was proposed by Musser, [20], for equa-
tional theories with a completely defined equality predi-
cate, This requirement placed a strong restriction on the
applicability of the method. The completion process used
to deduce consistency was the Knuth-Bendix algorithm,
[17].
Huet and Hullot [14] extended the method to theories
with free constructors, and Jouannaud and Kounalis, [15],
extended it further, requiring thatE should be a convergent
rewrite system. Bachmair, [4], proposed the first refuta-
tionally complete deduction system for the problem, using
a linear strategy for inductive completion. This is a re-
striction of the Knuth-Bendix algorithm which entails only
examining overlaps between axioms and conjectures. The
key advantage of the restricted completion procedure was
its ability to cope with unoriented equations. The refuta-
tional completeness of the procedure was a direct result of
this.
The technique has been extended to the non-equational
case. Ganzinger and Stuber, [12], proposed a method
for proving consistency for a set of first-order clauses
with equality using a refutation complete linear system.
Kounalis and Rusinowitch, [18], proposed an extension to
conditional theories, laying the foundations for the method
implemented in the SPIKE theorem, [6]. Ideas from the
proof by consistency technique have been used in other in-
duction methods, such as cover set induction, [13], and test
set induction, [5].
2Such a technique must necessarily be incomplete with respect to
proving theorems correct, by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
3The initial or standard model is the minimal Herbrand model. This
is unique in the case of a purely equational specification.
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2.3 Cryptographic Security Protocols
Cryptographic protocols are used in distributed systems
to allow agents to communicate securely. Assumed to be
present in the system is a spy, who can see all the traffic in
the network and may send malicious messages in order to
try and impersonate users and gain access to secrets. Clark
and Jacob’s survey, [9], and Anderson and Needham’s ar-
ticle, [3], are good introductions to the field.
Although security protocols are usually quite short, typ-
ically 2–5 messages, they often have subtle flaws in them
that may not be discovered for many years. Researchers
have applied various formal methods techniques to the
problem, to try to find attacks on faulty protocols, and to
prove correct protocols secure. These approaches include
belief logics such as the so-called BAN logic, [7], state-
machines, [11, 16], model-checking, [19], and inductive
theorem proving, [21]. Each approach has its advantages
and disadvantages. For example, the BAN logic is attrac-
tively simple, and has found some protocol flaws, but has
missed others. The model checking approach can find
flaws very quickly, but can only be applied to finite (and
typically very small) instances of the protocol. This means
that if no attack is found, there may still be an attack upon
a larger instance. Modern state machine approaches can
also find and exhibit attacks quickly, but require the user to
choose and prove lemmas in order to reduce the problem
to a tractable finite search space. The inductive method
deals directly with the infinite state problem, and assumes
an arbitrary number of protocol participants, but proofs are
tricky and require days or weeks of expert effort. If a proof
breaks down, there are no automated facilities for the de-
tection of an attack.
3 The Comon-Nieuwenhuis Method
Comon and Nieuwenhuis, [10], have shown that the pre-
vious techniques for proof by consistency can be gener-
alised to the production of a first-order axiomatisation A
of the minimal Herbrand model such that A ∪ E ∪ C is
consistent if and only if C is an inductive consequence
of E. With A satisfying the properties they define as an
I-Axiomatisation, inductive proofs can be reduced to first-
order consistency problems and so can be solved by any
saturation based theorem prover. We give a very brief sum-
mary of their results here. Suppose I is, in the case of
Horn or equational theories, the unique minimal Herbrand
model, or in the case of non-Horn theories, the so-called
perfect model with respect to a total ordering on terms,
4:
Definition 1 A set of first-order formulae A is an I-
Axiomatisation of I if
4Saturation style theorem proving always requires that we have such
an ordering available.
1. A is a set of purely universally quantified formulae
2. I is the only Herbrand model of E ∪A up to isomor-
phism.
An I-Axiomatisation is normal if A |= s 6= t for all pairs
of distinct normal terms s and t
The I-Axiomatisation approach produces a clean separa-
tion between the parts of the system concerned with induc-
tive completion and inconsistency detection. Completion
is carried out by a saturation based theorem prover, with
inference steps restricted to those produced by conjecture
superposition, a restriction of the standard superposition
rule. Only overlaps between conjecture clauses and ax-
ioms are considered. Each non-redundant clause derived
is checked for consistency against the I-Axiomatisation. If
the theorem prover terminates with saturation, the set of
formulae produced comprise a fair induction derivation.
The key result of the theory is this:
Theorem 1 Let A be a normal I-Axiomatisation, and
C0, C1, . . . be a fair induction derivation. Then I |= C0 iff
A ∪ {c} is consistent for all clauses c in⋃i Ci.
This theorem is proved in [10]. Comon and Nieuwenhuis
have shown that this conception of proof by consistency
generalises and extends earlier approaches. An equality
predicate as defined by Musser, a set of free constructors
as proposed by Huet and Hullot or a ground reducibility
predicate as defined by Jouannaud and Kounalis could all
be used to form a suitable I-Axiomatisation. The tech-
nique is also extended beyond ground convergent spec-
ifications (equivalent to saturated specifications for first-
order clauses) as required in [15, 4, 12]. Previous methods,
e.g. [6], have relaxed this condition by using conditional
equations. However a ground convergent rewrite system
was still required for deducing inconsistency. Using the
I-Axiomatisation method, conjectures can be proved or
refuted in (possibly non-free) constructor theories which
cannot be specified by a convergent rewrite system.
Whether these extensions to the theory allow larger the-
orems to be proved remains to be seen, and is not of in-
terest to us here. We are interested in how the wider ap-
plicability of the method can allow us to investigate the
ability of the proof by consistency technique to root out a
counterexample to realistic incorrect conjectures.
4 Implementation
Figure 1 illustrates the operation of our system. The in-
put is an inductive problem in Saturate format and a
normal I-Axiomatisation (see Definition 1, above). The
version of Saturate customised by Nieuwenhuis for im-
plicit induction (the right hand box in the diagram) gets the
problem file only, and proceeds to pursue inductive com-
pletion, i.e. to derive a fair induction derivation. Every
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Figure 1: System operation
non-redundant clause generated is passed via the server to
the refutation control program (the leftmost box). For ev-
ery new clause received, this program generates a problem
file containing the I-Axiomatisation and the new clause,
and spawns a standard version of Saturate to check the
consistency of the file. Crucially, these spawned Sat-
urates are not given the original axioms – only the I-
Axioms are required, by Theorem 1. This means that al-
most all of the search for an inconsistency is done by the
prover designed for inductive problems and the spawned
Saturates are just used to check for inconsistencies be-
tween the new clauses and the I-Axiomatisation. This
should lead to a false conjecture being refuted after fewer
inference steps have been attempted than if the conjecture
had been given to a standard first-order prover together
with all the axioms and I-Axioms. We evaluate this in the
next section.
If, at any time, a refutation is found by a spawned
prover, the proof is written to a file and the completion pro-
cess and all the other spawned Saturate processes are
killed. If completion is reached by the induction prover,
this is communicated to the refutation control program,
which will then wait for the results from the spawned pro-
cesses. If they all terminate with saturation, then there are
no inconsistencies, and so the theorem has been proved (by
Theorem 1).
There are several advantages to the parallel architecture
we have employed. One is that it allows us to refute in-
correct conjectures even if the inductive completion pro-
cess does not terminate. This would also be possible by
modifying the main induction Saturate to check each
clause in tern, but this would result in a rather messy and
unwieldy program. Another advantage is that we are able
to easily devote a machine solely to inductive completion
in the case of harder problems. It is also very convenient
when testing a new model to be able to just look at the de-
duction process before adding the consistency check later
on, and we preserve the attractive separation in the theory
between the deduction and the consistency checking pro-
cesses.
A disadvantage of our implementation is that launching
a new Saturate process to check each clause against
the I-Axiomatisation generates some overheads in terms
of disk access etc. In our next implementation, when a
spawned prover reaches saturation (i.e. no inconsisten-
cies), it will clear its database and ask the refutation con-
trol client for another clause to check, using the existing
sockets mechanism. This will cut down the amount of
memory and disk access required. A further way to re-
duce the consistency checking burden is to take advantage
of knowledge about the structure of the I-Axiomatisation
for simple cases. For example, in the case of a free con-
structor specification, the I-Axiomatisation will consist of
clauses specifying the inequality of non-identical construc-
tor terms. Since it will include no rules referring to defined
symbols, it is sufficient to limit the consistency check to
generated clauses containing only constructors and vari-
ables.
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Table 1: Sample of results. In the third column, the first number shows the number of clauses derived by the inductive
completion prover, and the number in brackets indicates the number of clauses derived by the parallel checker to spot
the inconsistency. The fourth column shows the number of clauses derived by an unmodified first-order prover when
given the conjecture, axioms and I-Axioms all together.
Problem Counterexamplefound
No. of clauses
derived to
find refutation
No. of clauses
derived by a
standard prover
∀N,M.¬(s(N) +M = s(0)) N = 0,M = 0 2(+0) 2
X 6= Y ∧X 6= 0 ∧ Y 6= 0
⇒ (X ≥ Y ∧ Y 6= 0)∨
(X 6= 0 ∧ Y = 0)
X = s(0),
Y = s(s(X)) 4 (+3) 6
app(K,L) = app(L,K) K = 0, L = s(X) 9(+11) stuck in loop
sort(l1) ∧ l2 = ap(l1, [head(l3)])
∧length(l3) ≥ 2 ∗ length(l1)
∧l3 6= nil∧
member(head(l1), tail(l3))
⇒ sort(l2)
l1 = [s(X)],
l2 = [s(X), 0]
l3 = [0, s(X)|Y ]
55(+1) 76
All graphs are acyclic [e(a, a)] 99 123
All loopless graphs are acyclic [e(s(a), a), e(a, s(a))] 178 2577
gcd(X,X) = 0 X = s(0) 17(+2) 29
Impossibility property
for Neuman-Stubblefield
key exchange protocol
[msg(1),msg(2),
msg(3),msg(4)] 866 (+0) 1733
Authenticity property for
simple protocol from [9] see section 6 730(+1) 3148
5 Evaluation of Results
Table 1 shows a sample of results achieved so far. The
first three examples are from Protzen’s work, [22], the next
two from Reif et al.’s, [25], and the last three are from
our work. The gcd example is included because previous
methods of proof by consistency could not refute this con-
jecture. Comon and Nieuwenhuis showed how it could
be tackled, [10], and here we confirm that their method
works. The last two conjectures are about properties of
security protocols. The ‘impossibility property’ states that
no trace reaches the end of a protocol. Its refutation com-
prises the proof of a possibility property, which is the first
thing proved about a newly modelled protocol in Paulson’s
method, [21]. The last result is the refutation of an authen-
ticity property, indicating an attack on the protocol. This
protocol is a simple example included in Clark’s survey,
[9], for didactic purposes, but requires that one principal
play both roles in a protocol run. More details are given in
section 6.
Our results on Reif et al.’s examples do not require the
user to verify a model condition, as the system described
in their work does. Interestingly, the formula remaining
as a model condition in their runs is often the same as
the formula which gives rise to the inconsistency when
checked against the I-Axiomatisation in our runs. This
is because the KIV system stops when it derives a term
containing just constructors and variables. In such a case,
our I-Axiomatisation would consist of formulae designed
to check validity of these terms. This suggests a way to
automate the model condition check in the KIV system.
On comparing the number of clauses derived by our sys-
tem and the number of clauses required by a standard first-
order prover (SPASS), we can see that the proof by consis-
tency strategy does indeed cut down on the number of in-
ferences required. This is more evident in the larger exam-
ples. Also, the linear strategy allows us to cope with com-
mutativity conjectures, like the third example, which cause
a standard prover to go into a loop. We might ask: what
elements of the proof by consistency technique are allow-
ing us to make this saving in required inferences? One is
the refutation completeness result for the linear strategy, so
we know we need only consider overlaps between conjec-
tures and axioms. Additionally, separating the I-Axioms
from the theory axioms reduces the number of overlaps be-
tween conjectures and axioms to be considered each time.
We also use the results about inductively complete posi-
tions for theories with free constructors, [10]. This applies
to all the examples except those in graph theory, where we
used Reif’s formalism and hence did not have free con-
structors. This is the probable reason why, on these two
examples, our system did not make as large a saving in
derived clauses.
The restriction to overlaps between conjectures and ax-
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ioms is similar in nature to the so-called set of support
strategy, using the conjecture as the initial supporting set.
The restriction in our method is tighter, since we don’t con-
sider overlaps between formulae in the set of support. Us-
ing the set of support strategy with the standard prover on
the examples in Table 1, refutations are found after de-
riving fewer clause than required by the standard strategy.
However, performance is still not as good as for our sys-
tem, particularly in the free constructor cases. The set of
support also doesn’t fix the problem of divergence on un-
oriented conjectures, like the commutativity example.
The efficiency of the method in terms of clauses derived
compared to a standard prover looks good. However, ac-
tual time taken by our system is much longer than that
for the standard SPASS. This is because the Saturate
prover is rather old, and was not designed to be a seri-
ous tool for large scale proving. In particular, it does not
utilise any term indexing techniques, and so redundancy
checks are extremely slow. As an example, the impossi-
bility property took about 50 minutes to refute in Satu-
rate, but about 40 seconds in SPASS, even though more
than twice as many clauses had to be derived. We used
Saturate in our first system as Nieuwenhuis had al-
ready implemented the proof by consistency strategy in the
prover. A re-implementation of the whole system using
SPASS should give us even faster refutations, and is one of
our next tasks.
Finally, we also tested the system on a number of small
inductive theorems. Being able to prove small theorems al-
lows us to attack a problem highlighted in Protzen’s work:
that if an candidate generalisation (say) is given to the
counterexample finder and it returns a result saying that
the depth limit was reached before a counterexample was
found, the system is none the wiser as to whether the gen-
eralisation is worth pursuing. If we are able to prove at
least small examples to be theorems, this will help allevi-
ate the problem. Our results were generally good: 7 out
of 8 examples we tried were proved, but one was missed.
Comon intends to investigate the ability of the technique
to prove more and larger theorems in future.
More details of the results including some sample runs
and details of the small theorems proved can be found at
http://www.dai.ed.ac.uk/˜grahams/linda.
6 Application to Cryptographic Se-
curity Protocols
We now describe some work in progress on applying our
technique to the cryptographic security protocol problem.
As we saw in section 2.3, one of the main thrusts of re-
search has been to apply formal methods to the problem.
Researchers have applied techniques from model check-
ing, theorem proving and modal logics amongst others.
Much attention is paid to the modelling of the abilities
of the spy in these models. However, an additional con-
sideration is the abilities of the participants. Techniques
assuming a finite model, with typically two agents playing
distinct roles, often rule out the possibility of discovering a
certain kind of parallel session attack, in which one partic-
ipant plays both roles in the protocol. The use of an induc-
tive model allows us to discover these kind of attacks. An
inductive model also allows us to consider protocols with
more than two participants, e.g. conference-key protocols.
Paulson’s inductive approach has used been used to ver-
ify properties of several protocols, [21]. Protocols are for-
malised in typed higher-order logic as the set of all pos-
sible traces, a trace being a list of events like ‘A sends
message X to B’. This formalism is mechanised in the Is-
abelle/HOL interactive theorem prover. Properties of the
security protocol can be proved by induction on traces.
The model assumes an arbitrary number of agents, and any
agent may take part in any number of concurrent protocol
runs playing any role. Using this method, Paulson discov-
ered a flaw in the simplified Otway-Rees shared key pro-
tocol, [7], giving rise to a parallel session attack where a
single participant plays both protocol roles. However, as
Paulson observed, a failed proof state can be difficult to
interpret in these circumstances. Even an expert user will
be unsure as to whether it is the proof attempt or the con-
jecture which is at fault. By applying our counterexample
finder to these problems, we can automatically detect and
present attacks when they exist.
Paulson’s formalism is in higher-order logic. However,
no ‘fundamentally’ higher-order concepts are used – in
particular there is no unification of higher-order objects.
Objects have types, and sets and lists are used. All this
can be modelled in first-order logic. The security protocol
problem has been modelled in first-order logic before, e.g.
by Weidenbach, [26]. This model assumed a two agent
model with just one available nonce5 and key, and so could
not detect the kind of parallel session attacks described.
Our model allows an arbitrary number of agents to partici-
pate, playing either role, and using an arbitrary number of
fresh nonces and keys.
6.1 Our Protocol Model
Our models aims to be as close as possible to a first-order
version of Paulson’s formalism. As in Paulson’s model,
agents, nonces and messages are free data types. This al-
lows us to define a two-valued function eq which will tell
us whether two pure constructor terms are equal or not.
Since the rules defining eq are exhaustive, they also have
the effect of suggesting instantiations where certain condi-
tions must be met, e.g. if we require the identities of two
agents to be distinct. The model is kept Horn by defin-
ing two-valued functions for checking the side conditions
for a message to be sent, e.g. we define conditions for
5A nonce is a unique identifying number.
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member(X,L) = true and member(X,L) = false us-
ing our eq function. This cuts down the branching rate of
the search.
The intruder’s knowledge is specified in terms of sets.
Given a trace of messages exchanged, XT , we define
analz (XT ) to be the least set including XT closed un-
der projection and decryption by known keys. This is ac-
complished by using exactly the same rules as the Paul-
son model, [21, p. 12]. Then, we can define the messages
the intruder may send, given a trace XT , as being mem-
bers of the set synth(analz (XT )), where synth(X) is the
least set including agent names closed under pairing and
encryption by known keys. Again this set is defined in our
model with the same axioms that Paulson uses.
A trace of messages is modelled as a list. For a specific
protocol, we generally require one axiom for each protocol
message. These axioms take the form of rules with the in-
formal interpretation, ‘if XT is a trace containing message
n addressed to agent xa , then the trace may be extended
by xa responding with message n+ 1’. Once again, this is
very similar to the Paulson model.
An example illustrates some of these ideas. In Figure 2
we demonstrate the formalism of a very simple protocol
included in Clark and Jacob’s survey to demonstrate paral-
lel session attacks, [9]. Although simple, the attack on the
protocol does require principal A to play the role of both
initiator and responder. It assumes that A and B already
share a secure key, KAB . NA denotes a nonce generated
by A.
In a symmetric key protocol, principals should respond
to key(A,B) and key(B,A), as they are in reality the
same. At the moment we model this with two possible
rules for message 2, but it should be straightforward to ex-
tend the model to give a cleaner treatment of symmetric
keys as sets of agents. Notice we allow a principal to re-
spond many times to the same message, as Paulson’s for-
malism does.
The second box, Figure 3, shows how the refutation of a
conjectured security property leads to the discovery of the
known attack. At the moment, choosing which conjectures
to attempt to prove is tricky. A little thought is required in
order to ensure that only a genuine attack can refute the
conjecture. More details of our model for the problem,
including the specification of intruder knowledge, can be
found at http://www.dai.ed.ac.uk/˜grahams/
linda.
This application highlights a strength of our refutation
system: in order to produce a backwards style proof, as
Paulson’s system does, we must apply rules with side con-
ditions referring as yet uninstantiated variables. For ex-
ample, a rule might be applied with the informal interpre-
tation, ‘if the spy can extract X from the trace of mes-
sages sent up to this point, then he can break the secu-
rity conjecture’. At the time the rule is applied, X will be
uninstantiated. Further rules instantiate parts of the trace,
and side conditions are either satisfied and eliminated, or
found to be unsatisfiable, causing the clauses containing
the condition to be pruned off as redundant. The side con-
ditions influence the path taken through the search space,
as smaller formulae are preferred by the default heuristic
in the prover. This means that some traces a na¨ive coun-
terexample search might find are not so attractive to our
system, e.g. a trace which starts with several principals
sending message 1 to other principals. This will not be
pursued at first, as all the unsatisfied side conditions will
make this formula larger than others.
7 Further Work
Our first priority is to re-implement the system using
SPASS, and then to carry out further experiments with
larger false conjectures and more complex security pro-
tocols. This will allow us to evaluate the technique more
thoroughly. A first goal is to rediscover the parallel session
attack discovered by Paulson. The system should also be
able to discover more standard attacks, and the Clark sur-
vey, [9], provides a good set of examples for testing. We
will then try the system on other protocols and look for
some new attacks. A key advantage of our security model
is that it allows attacks involving arbitrary numbers of par-
ticipants. This should allow us to investigate the security
of protocols involving many participants in a single run,
e.g. conference key protocols.
In future, we also intend to implement more sophisti-
cated heuristics to improve the search performance, util-
ising domain knowledge about the security protocol prob-
lem. Heuristics could include eager checks for unsatisfi-
able side conditions. Formulae containing these conditions
could be discarded as redundant. Another idea is to vary
the weight ascribed to variables and function symbols, so
as to make the system inclined to check formulae with pre-
dominantly ground variables before trying ones with many
uninstantiated variables. This should make paths to attacks
more attractive to the search mechanism, but some careful
experimentation is required to confirm this.
The Comon-Nieuwenhuis technique has some remain-
ing restrictions on applicability, in particular the need for
reductive definitions, a more relaxed notion of reducibility
than is required for ground convergent rewrite systems. It
is quite a natural requirement that recursive function def-
initions should be reducing in some sense. For example,
the model of the security protocol problem is reductive
in the sense required by Comon and Nieuwenhuis. Even
so, it should be possible to extend the technique for non-
theorem detection in the case of non-reductive definitions,
at the price of losing any reasonable chance of proving a
theorem, but maintaining the search guidance given by the
proof by consistency technique. This would involve al-
lowing inferences by standard superposition if conjecture
superposition is not applicable.
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The Clark-Jacob protocol demonstrating parallel session attacks. At the end of a run,A should now be assured
of B’s presence, and has accepted nonce NA to identify authenticated messages.
1. A→ B : {| NA}|KAB
2. B → A : {| NA + 1}|KAB
Formula for modelling message 1 of the protocol. Informally: if XT is a trace, XA and XB agents, and XNA
a number not appearing as a nonce in a previous run, then the trace may be extended by XA initiating a run,
sending message 1 of the protocol to XB.
m(XT ) = true ∧ agent(XA) = true ∧ agent(XB) = true ∧ number(XNA) = true
∧member(sent(X,Y, encr(nonce(XNA),K)),XT ) = false ⇒
m([sent(XA,XB , encr(nonce(XNA), key(XA,XB)))|XT ]) = true
Formulae for message 2. Two formulae are used to make the response to the shared key symmetric (see text).
Informally: if XT is a trace containing message 1 of the protocol addressed to agent XB, encrypted under a
key he shares with agent XA, then the trace may be extended by agent XB responding with message 2.
member(sent(X,XB , encr(nonce(XNA), key(XA,XB))),XT ) = true ∧m(XT ) = true ⇒
m([sent(XB ,XA, encr(s(nonce(XNA)), key(XA,XB)))|XT ]) = true.
member(sent(X,XB , encr(nonce(XNA), key(XB ,XA))),XT ) = true ∧m(XT ) = true ⇒
m([sent(XB ,XA, encr(s(nonce(XNA)), key(XB ,XA)))|XT ]) = true.
Figure 2: The modelling of the Clark-Jacob protocol
The parallel session attack suggested by Clark and Jacob [9]. At the end of the attack, A believes B is
operational. B may be absent or may no longer exist:
1. A→ CB : {| NA}|KAB
2. CB → A : {| NA}|KAB
3. A→ CB : {| s(NA)}|KAB
4. CB → A : {| s(NA)}|KAB
Below is the incorrect security conjecture, the refutation of which gives rise to the attack above. Informally
this says, ‘for all valid traces T , if A starts a run with B using nonce NA, and receives the reply s(NA) from
principal X , and no other principal has sent a reply, then the reply must have come from agent B.’
member(sent(XA,XB , encr(nonce(XNA),K),XT ) = true
∧XT = [sent(X ,XA, encr(s(nonce(XNA)),K)|T ]
∧member(sent(Y,XA, encr(s(nonce(XNA)),K),T ) = false
∧m(XT ) = true ⇒ eq(X,XB) = true
The final line of output from the system, giving the attack.
c(sent(spy,a,encr(s(nonce(0)),key(a,s(a)))),
c(sent(a,s(a),encr(s(nonce(0)),key(a,s(a)))),
c(sent(spy,a,encr(nonce(0),key(a,s(a)))),
c(sent(a,s(a),encr(nonce(0),key(a,s(a)))),nil))))
Figure 3: The attack and its discovery
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8 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a working implementation
of a novel method for investigating an inductive conjec-
ture, with a view to proving it correct or refuting it as false.
We are primarily concerned with the ability of the system
to refute false conjectures, and have shown results from
testing on a variety of examples. These have shown that
our parallel inductive completion and consistency check-
ing system requires considerably fewer clauses to be de-
rived than a standard first-order prover does when tackling
the whole problem at once. The application of the tech-
nique to producing attacks on faulty cryptographic secu-
rity protocols looks promising, and the system has already
synthesised an attack of a type many finite security models
will not detect. We intend to produce a faster implemen-
tation using the SPASS theorem prover, and then to pursue
this application further.
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